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The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2012: Temporarily Curtailed by the Homeowner Flood 
Insurance Act of 2014—A Respite to Forge an Enduring 
Correction to the National Flood Insurance Program 
Built on Virtuous Economic and Environmental 
Incentives 
Alexander B. McDonnell 
One who knows the Mississippi will promptly aver—not aloud, 
but to himself—that ten thousand River Commissions, with the 
mines of the world at their back, cannot tame that lawless 
stream, cannot curb it or confine it, cannot say to it, Go here, 
or Go there, and make it obey; cannot save a shore which it 
has sentenced; cannot bar its path with an obstruction which it 
will not tear down, dance over, and laugh at.  
―Mark Twain1 
INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Sandy descended on New Jersey in late October of 
2012. The densely populated region braced for record storm surges, 
flooding,
2
 and power loss.
3
 More than $7.9 billion in National Flood 
 
   B.A., History (2007), DePaul University; M.B.A. (2015), Olin Business School at 
Washington University in St. Louis; J.D. (2015), Washington University School of Law. Thank 
you to my parents and brother who fostered my love for nature, taught me about equity, and 
who I know believe as I do—that prudent land-use must consider both. Thank you to Shannon 
for maintaining my health with nutritious juices and prophylactic elixirs, and for her 
unwavering support. Lastly, a special thank you to my friends and colleagues at the Journal for 
their expert contributions to this piece. 
 1. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 234 (P.F. Collier, 1917) (1874).  
 2. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 2 (2011), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1438-20490-1905/f084_atq_11aug11.pdf [hereinafter ANSWERS] (“Flood 
is defined in the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP), in part, as: ‘A general and temporary 
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Insurance Program (NFIP)
4
 payments were eventually dispersed to 
policyholders affected by the storm.
5
 These policyholders benefited 
from an antiquated version of the four-decade-old, federally 
subsidized NFIP because their former premiums significantly 
underestimated the flood risk to their properties.
6
  
The passage and looming implementation of the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters) altered the 
New Jersey residents’ calculus.7 They needed to determine if they 
could afford to dwell in their rebuilt homes given near certain 
increases to flood insurance costs.
8 Anticipated and observed growth 
of severe coastal storms and flood frequency from rising sea levels 
 
condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more acres of normally dry land area or of 
two or more properties . . . from overflow of inland or tidal waters, from unusual and rapid 
accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any source, or from mudflow.’”). 
 3. See Hurricane Sandy Recovery Efforts One Year Later, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1382967173777-7411aa1 
b6d729a8a97e84dbba62083d8/FEMA%20Sandy%20One%20Year%20Fact%20Sheet_508.pdf 
[hereinafter One Year].  
 4. See Flood Insurance Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-264 (2004), National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act, Pub. L. No 103-325 (1994); Flood Disaster Protection Act, Pub. Law 
93-234 (1973); Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. Law 91-152 (1969); and Housing 
and Urban Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §4201-4128. 
 5. See One Year, supra note 3. More than 8.5 million people lost power, 23,000 needed 
temporary shelter, $4.6 billion was spent for individual assistance and emergency work, and 
$2.4 billion was distributed in the form of low-interest disaster loans. Id. 
 6. See The National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §4054(a) (2012). “The 
Administrator . . . shall make periodic payments to the [flood insurance pool] . . . in recognition 
of such reductions in chargeable premium rates under section 4015 of this title below estimated 
premium rates under section 4014(a)(1) of this title as are required in order to make flood 
insurance available on reasonable terms and conditions.” Id. See also Christopher Joyce, 
Program Drowning in Debt. Who Will Pay?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/01/258706269/federal-flood-insurance-program-drowning-in-debt-
who-will-pay. “Millions of American property owners get flood insurance from the federal 
government, and a lot of them get a hefty discount...You can buy a FEMA flood insurance 
policy for about half the ‘actuarial’ rate private insurers would offer. (The actuarial rate more 
accurately reflects the value of a property at risk.)” Id. 
 7. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 916 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4131 (2012)). 
 8. See Joyce, supra note 6. “[Over] the past decade, the government has paid out huge 
amounts of money after floods, and the flood insurance program is deeply in the red. Congress 
tried to fix that in 2012 by passing a law to raise insurance premiums. Now that move has 
created such uproar among property owners that Congress is trying to make the law it passed 
disappear.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/15
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further complicated their calculations of whether to remain.
9 
A 
growing number of Americans now share the same concerns as these 
New Jersey residents. Coastal populations in the United States grow 
at an alarming pace, doubling-down on already population-dense 
areas
10
 bolstered by the NFIP.
11
  
Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to 
provide financial security for property owners in elevated flood-risk 
areas.
12
 The law made otherwise risky development areas viable, and 
 
 9. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, INTRODUCTION TO THIRD 
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REPORT (2014), available at http://nca2014.globalchange. 
gov/report/our-changing-climate/sea-level-rise. 
Scientists are working to narrow the range of sea level rise projections for this century 
. . . In the context of risk-based analysis, some decision makers may wish to use a 
wider range of scenarios, from 8 inches to 6.6 feet by 2100 . . . Nearly 5 million people 
in the U.S. live within 4 feet of the local high-tide level . . . In the next several decades, 
storm surges and high tides could combine with sea level rise and land subsidence to 
further increase flooding in many of these regions . . . Sea level rise will not stop in 
2100 because the oceans take a very long time to respond to warmer conditions at the 
Earth’s surface. Ocean waters will therefore continue to warm and sea level will 
continue to rise for many centuries at rates equal to or higher than that of the current 
century.  
Id. 
 10. See NOAA, NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION REPORT: POPULATION TRENDS FROM 
1970 TO 2020, 4, Fig. 3, (2013), available at http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/features/coastal-
population-report.pdf. “In 2010, 123.3 million people, or 39 percent of the nation’s population 
lived in Coastal Shoreline Counties . . . the population in Coastal Shoreline Counties increased 
by 34.8 million people, a 39 percent increase, while the nation’s entire population increased by 
52 percent over the same time period.” Id. While costal population growth is outpaced by the 
national average, the data does not incorporate populations along rivers or consider population 
density. See NOAA, NOAA’S STATE OF THE COAST: COMMUNITIES: THE U.S. POPULATION 
LIVING AT THE COAST, (2013) available at http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/population/ 
welcome.html. Coastal shoreline counties make-up ten percent of the U.S. land area (excluding 
Alaska). Id. However, U.S. coastal county population density is more than four times the U.S. 
average (446 persons per square mile (excluding Alaska), compared to the U.S. average of 105 
persons per square mile). Id.  
 11. Joyce, supra note 6. “Millions of American property owners get flood insurance from 
the federal government, and a lot of them get a hefty discount...You can buy a FEMA flood 
insurance policy for about half the ‘actuarial’ rate private insurers would offer. (The actuarial 
rate more accurately reflects the value of a property at risk.)” Id. 
 12. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4131 (2012)).  
The Congress finds that (1) from time to time flood disasters have created personal 
hardships and economic distress which have required unforeseen disaster relief 
measures and have placed an increasing burden on the Nation’s resources; (2) despite 
the installation of preventative and protective works and the adoption of other public 
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stabilized or increased real property values in areas stricken with well 
above-average likelihoods for flood events.
13
  
The NFIP, prior to Biggert-Waters, allowed certain homeowners 
to purchase flood insurance for “about half the ‘actuarial’ rate private 
insurers would offer.”14 Now, after decades of underpriced premiums, 
steady growth in the number of outstanding flood insurance policies, 
and more severe and frequent flood events the program is $24 billion 
in debt (as of January 2014).
15
   
Biggert-Waters sought to quell the NFIP’s swelling financial 
liability through premium adjustments, flood mapping enhancements, 
 
programs designed to reduce losses caused by flood damage, these methods have not 
been sufficient to protect adequately against growing exposure to future flood losses; 
(3) as a matter of national policy, a reasonable method of sharing the risk of flood 
losses is through a program of flood insurance which can complement and encourage 
preventative and protective measures; and (3) if such a program is initiated and carried 
out gradually, it can be expanded as knowledge is gained and experience appraised, 
thus making flood insurance coverage available on reasonable terms and conditions to 
persons who have need for such protection.  
Id. § 4001(a). See also id. § 4002(a)(5)-(6). 
The Congress finds that—. . .(5) the Nation cannot afford the tragic losses of life 
caused annually by flood occurrences, nor the increasing losses of property suffered by 
flood victims, most of whom are still inadequately compensated despite the provision 
of costly disaster relief benefits; and (6) it is in the public interest for persons already 
living in flood-prone areas to have both an opportunity to purchase flood insurance and 
access to more adequate limits of coverage, so that they will be indemnified, for their 
losses in the event of future flood disasters.  
Id. See also id. § 4012. “Priority for insurance for certain residential and church properties and 
business concerns.” Id. 
 13. Id. § 4012. Consider that the intrinsic value of an asset like real property equals the 
present value of its future cash flows. When revenue and discount rates remain constant but 
expenses rise (e.g., flood insurance premiums increase) then cash flows are reduced and the 
value of the asset diminishes. See also Joyce, supra note 6. Federal subsidization of flood 
insurance premiums increases the value of properties in flood plains because it reduces the cost 
of ownership. Hence, undeveloped property that without the federal subsidy did not provide an 
adequate return could—given the reduced expenses associated with its ownership—become 
profitable enough to justify development. 
 14. Joyce, supra note 6.  
 15. See id. “FEMA has a problem. ‘We are $24 billion in debt’ says Craig Fugate, who 
directs FEMA. Fugate delivered that bit of news to Congress’ House Financial Services 
Committee in Washington, D.C., recently, as he tried to make the case for raising insurance 
rates.” Id. See also Sarah Fox, This is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the 
National Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 218 (2014). Unable to cover 
all claims from Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP secured increased borrowing authority from 
Congress to $20.775 billion. After Hurricane Sandy, NFIP borrowing authority expanded to 
$30 billion. See id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/15
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and the potential incorporation of private reinsurance.
16
 Its passage in 
2012 by a “do-nothing Congress” unable to find much common 
ground to address the federal government’s other fiscal difficulties17 
hints at the significance of the bipartisan consensus behind the law at 
the time—and arguably—its necessity.18 
Biggert-Waters harnessed political will only briefly, however. A 
movement emerged to delay and strip the NFIP of its most critical 
Biggert-Waters amendments—the removal of subsidized premiums. 
In 2014, President Obama signed into law the Homeowner Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (Affordability Act),
19
 
indefinitely postponing the requirement to impose risk premiums for 
flood insurance that “accurately reflect the current risk of flood to 
such property.”20 The US Senate voted sixty-seven to thirty-two to 
approve the Affordability Act.
21
 The new law was promoted by 
Representative Maxine Waters—the very legislator who sponsored 
Biggert-Waters.
22
 The White House was initially critical of the 
 
 16. See Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartsafer.org and the Biggert-Waters Act of 
2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2012–2013) (describing the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act 2012). 
 17. See Chris Cillizza, The Least Productive Congress Ever, WASH. POST, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-congress-ever 
(citing statistics that Congress in 2012 passed only 561 bills, “the lowest number since they 
began keeping these stats way back in 1947”). 
 18. Partisanship aside, consider the political and economic climates in 2012. The Great 
Recession, while it waned, still dominated attention among domestic political issues. For Votes 
It’s Still the Economy, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/ 
2012/09/24/for-voters-its-still-the-economy/. Normally, most legislators in both houses of 
Congress would have balked at any bill to increase costs for Americans—lest it amount to a tax 
increase. Bigger-Waters however, emerged alive despite the significant premium increases. 
 19. See S. 1926, 113th Cong. (2014).  
 20. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100207, 
126 Stat. 405, 919 (2012). [42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012).] 
 21. See S. 1926, 113th Cong. (2014). See also Natasha Lindstrom, Senate Bill Delays 
Flood Insurance Hikes, THE INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.theintell.com/news/ 
local/u-s-senate-bill-delays-flood-insurance-hikes/article_27a3269d-f490-5e73-a548-3ca67ec2d 
2c9.html. Senators Robert Menendez, Democrat from New Jersey, and Johnny Isakson, 
Republican from Georgia, wrote the Act. See id. 
 22. See Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law Is Target of Both Political 
Parties, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/us/politics/popular-
flood-insurance-law-is-target-of-both-political-parties.html. “Although the effort there is being 
led by Ms. Waters, she already has more than 180 co-sponsors from both parties, and House 
Speaker John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio, indicated that G.O.P. leadership may consider 
the effort.” Id. 
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Affordability Act and asserted that it would further degrade the NFIP 
fiscal position and place into question the federal government’s 
ability to pay future claims.
23
 Nonetheless, in the end, political 
pressure overwhelmed the economic and environmental imperatives 
furthered by Biggert-Waters, now dead in the water.   
Political bombardment of the Biggert-Waters amendments and the 
recent implementation of the Affordability Act offers a chance to 
consider a more thoughtful approach to the NFIP.
24
 Premiums that 
reflect actual flood risk are popular among fiscal conservatives, free-
market proponents, and environmentalists alike, but the imposition of 
significant premium increases on property owners—even gradually 
over five years—chafes at morality, let alone economic prudence.25  
The question is: How can Congress preserve local communities 
that arose or expanded under an anachronistic NFIP and also 
gracefully cease misguided incentives imbedded in risk-ignorant 
NFIP flood insurance prices, encourage real estate development that 
incorporates appropriate economic and environmental flood risk 
considerations, lower NFIP debt, and control for risk in the nation’s 
fisc? 
This Note proposes that Congress should reverse the Affordability 
Act’s drastic gutting of Biggert-Waters and pass omnibus legislation 
 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Joyce, supra note 6. Even the namesake of Biggert-Waters, Representative 
Maxine Waters of California, has blasted the NFIP amendments.  
Waters described her law as “well-meaning,” and then scolded Fugate, FEMA 
Administrator, for not coming to Congress earlier to explain just how high the 
premium increases would go (though they were specifically called for in the Biggert-
Waters Act). “Let me just say,” she told Fugate, “all of the harm that has been caused 
to thousands of people across the country—[who] are calling, [who] are going to lose 
their homes, [who] are placed in this position—is just unconscionable.’” 
Id. 
 25. See Fox, supra note 15, at 211. Fox reflects on the difficulty with discontinuation of a 
widespread public subsidy.  
People were able to settle in sprawling suburbs because of the low cost of 
transportation, were enticed to move to the desert based on an artificially low price of 
water, and made choices to live in coastal communities because of guarantees provided 
by subsidized flood insurance. Those choices are likely to come with a sense of 
entitlement to the continuation of these subsidies in perpetuity, and shifts in policy that 
force changes in lifestyle are likely to be met with an emotional response.  
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/15
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that reforms the NFIP through: (1) more gradual implementation of 
premium increases,  (2) cessation of federal mortgage insurance for 
mortgages in high flood risk areas, and (3) the creation of a land 
purchase tax credit to property owners who proactively relocate.   
I. HISTORY OF NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY 
A. Path to the NFIP  
American notions of human influence on the behavior of 
waterways are centuries old.
26
 Early public attempts to limit flood 
risk centered on the role of forests in the preservation of natural 
hydrologic cycles and as buffers to watershed fluctuations and human 
activity.
27
 US policy in the early twentieth century—as reflected by 
the Weeks Act
28—seemed to favor resilience techniques over more 
expensive and drastic resistance methods that often involve 
infrastructure improvements.
29
 President Franklin Roosevelt charged 
 
 26. See Douglas Helms, Legacy of the Flood Control Act of 1936, in THE FLOOD 
CONTROL CHALLENGE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 67 (Rosen, Howard & Martin Reuss eds., 
1988), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/about/history/? 
cid=nrcs143_010953. Observations of the effects that deforestation for agricultural purposes 
had on riparian areas in Seventeenth Century New England were put forth by colonial naturalist 
John Bartram who Hems quotes, “wear to ye sand & clay which it bears away with ye swift 
current down to brooks & rivers whose banks it overflows.” Id. (quoting HUGH HAMMOND 
BENNETT, SOIL CONSERVATION 869 (MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, 1939). 
 27. See Helms, supra note 26, at 67. 
 28. Weeks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-862, 36 Stat. 961 (1911); The Weeks Act, U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE HISTORY, http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Policy/WeeksAct/index.aspx (last 
updated Mar. 1, 2013). President Taft signed the Weeks Act into law in 1911. Id. The law, 
“permitted the federal government to purchase private land in order to protect the headwaters of 
rivers and watersheds in the eastern United States . . . [and is described as] one of the most 
successful pieces of conservation legislation in U.S. history.” Id. 
 29.  The Weeks Act, supra note 28. Generally speaking, there are three approaches to flood 
risk—avoidance (e.g., not building in a floodplain or rebuilding after a flood disaster), 
resilience (e.g., allowing water to flow naturally and design structures to compliment this), and 
resistance (e.g., preventing or significantly altering natural water flow to allow for existence of 
a structure). See generally, ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, A GUIDE TO RESISTANT AND 
RESILIENT REPAIR AFTER A FLOOD (2009), available at https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-
savings/Topics-and-issues/~/media/0837E8F0B35147D59A92D0A7231A572F.ashx. For a 
comparison of United States and Dutch flood policy and discussion about disaster avoidance 
see Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/netherlands-sets-model-of-flood-prevention. 
html (“The Dutch ‘way of thinking is completely different from the U.S.,’ where disaster relief 
generally takes precedence over disaster avoidance, said Wim Kuijken, the Dutch government’s 
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the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to apply forestry and soil 
erosion efforts to “broad areas rather than . . . [an] individual parcel 
of land . . . [revealing] his faith in the value of forests in reducing 
floods.”30 
New Deal politics, economics, scientific disagreements, and 
timely spring floods moved President Roosevelt from a preference 
for resilience and avoidance methods of flood management to one of 
resistance.
31
 He signed the Flood Control Act of 1936
32
 “enabl[ing] 
the federal government to build dams and levees.”33 For several 
decades thereafter, the federal government’s proactive line of defense 
against flood risk for coastal and riparian dwellers and businesses 
included crudely thought-out dams, levees, and seawalls.
34
 Levees 
 
senior official for water control policy. ‘The U.S. is excellent at disaster management,’ but 
‘working to avoid disaster is completely different from working after a disaster.”) and ABHAS K 
JHA, ROBIN BLOCH, & JESSICA LAMOND, CITIES AND FLOODING: A GUIDE TO INTEGRATED 
URBAN FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 32 (2012). Flood avoidance is 
categorized by some as a “Non-structural” measure that relies on accurate flood forecasting. An 
example of avoidance flood technique includes land use planning and land use regulations 
designed to discourage new construction in high-risk flood areas.  
 30. See Helms, supra note 26. 
 31. See id. “The legislative journey of the Flood Control Act of 1936 began in response to 
the spring floods, but emerged as a national policy on flood control.” Id. 
 32. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1. President Franklin Roosevelt 
signed the act into law and affirmed Congressional declaration of policy which states in part:  
[D]estructive floods upon the rivers of the United States, upsetting orderly processes 
and causing loss of life and property, including the erosion of lands . . . constitute a 
menace to national welfare . . . that the Federal Government should improve or 
participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries, including 
watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may 
accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of 
people are otherwise adversely affected.  
Id 
 33. Beth Davidson, How Quickly We Forget: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 366 (2005). 
 34. See id. at 366–67. “Despite the government’s investment of billions of dollars into 
flood control projects, flood damages continued to rise. In the 1950s, when the government first 
considered flood insurance, it was clear that private industry could not provide coverage and 
retain a profit.” Moreover, “the costs of building and maintaining structural measures, such as 
dams and levees, were increasing, as were losses from flooding.” Id at 367. Yet the structural 
measures also “created a false sense of security that led to development in flood-prone areas” 
and upon failure “caused more damage than if the structural measures had never existed.” Id. 
See also Fox, supra note 15, at 213 (The Flood Control Act of 1936 “authorized the 
construction of more than 200 specific flood control projects . . . control measures tended to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/15
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and dams were increasingly relied on to provide stability in flood-
prone areas.
35
 These structural measures contributed greatly to 
development in floodplains and to the damage caused by flood 
events.
36
 Furthermore, “[generally], disaster assistance was the only 
financial recourse for flood victims” at that time.37 
“Billion Dollar Betsy”, a category three hurricane,38 crashed into 
the Louisiana coast in September 1965.
39
 The hurricane killed 
 
exacerbate the problems that they were intended to solve by fostering misplaced confidence in 
the safety of living in the floodplain and tampering with the operation of the ecosystem.”). 
 35. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 366–67. See also supra text accompanying note 26. 
See JOSEPH ARNOLD, OFFICE OF HISTORY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS., THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE 1936 FLOOD CONTROL ACT (1988), available at http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/ 
Portals/76/Publications/EngineerPamphlets/EP_870-1-29.pdf. (“The [Flood Control Act of 
1936] authorized hundreds of flood control projects and established policies that endure to this 
day. Moreover, it dramatically increased the Corps’ work load, forcing the agency to develop 
new procedures and offices”). See also Higgins, supra note 29.  
 36. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 365–67. To make matters worse, if the levees failed, 
“flooding caused more damage than if the structural measures had never existed, increasing the 
costs of floods.” Id. at 367; see also id. (quoting Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National 
Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 67 (1985) (“If investments have 
been placed below a dam or behind a levee, relying on their protection, the losses will be 
greater than ever. Another limitation . . . is that constriction of the floodplain in one area will 
inevitably increase water stages somewhere else. The net result has been that ‘[e]fforts at 
control may, in some cases, in the end produce results worse than they were intended to 
cure.’”)). 
 37. Davidson, supra note 33, at 366; See also Fox, supra note 15, at 213 (discussing the 
general unavailability of private flood insurance prior to the NFIP, and explaining that “local, 
state, and especially, the federal government bore the burden of providing flood victims with 
disaster relief funds . . . [which] ‘placed an increasing burden on the Nation’s resources.’” 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (a)(1) (1988)). 
 38. See TIMOTHY SCHOTT ET AL., NAT’L WEATHER SER., THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON 
HURRICANE WIND SCALE 1 (2012), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/sshws.pdf. The 
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale rates hurricanes between one and five based on wind 
speed at particular points in time. Id. Category Three Hurricanes cause “devastating damage” 
with wind speeds of 111–129 miles per hour. Id. at 3.  
There is a high risk of injury or death to people . . . [n]early all older (pre-1994) mobile 
homes will be destroyed . . . [p]oorly constructed frame homes can be destroyed, 
[w]ell built frame homes can experience major damage . . . [t]here will be a high 
percentage of roof covering and siding damage to apartment buildings and industrial 
buildings . . . [c]omplete failure of older metal buildings is possible and unreinforced 
masonry buildings can collapse . . . [m]any trees will be snapped or uprooted [and] 
[e]lectricity and water will be unavailable for several days to a few weeks after the 
storm passes. 
Id. 
 39. J. SCOTT HOLLADAY & JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY: NYU 
SCH. OF LAW, FLOODING THE MARKET: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NFIP 1 
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seventy-five people and caused destruction on the order of $1 
billion.
40
 Private flood insurance was generally unavailable to 
property owners prior to the hurricane, so the federal government and 
Louisiana residents were forced to bear the financial burden for 
recovery.
41
  
Immediately following Hurricane Betsy, the federal government 
considered new methods to insulate property owners and federal 
disaster relief funds from natural catastrophes. Congress passed the 
Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act
42
 after Betsy in 1965 to 
furnish disaster relief for the affected region, and notably, to consider 
the utility of prophylactic tools to reduce the financial burden posed 
by flood recovery—including the provision of insurance.43  
The private insurance industry was, and still is, both unwilling and 
unequipped to provide flood insurance.
44
 Risk diversification, or risk 
pooling, by way of “the law of large numbers” forms the backbone of 
an insurance provider.
45
 Floods, because of their catastrophic and 
 
(Policy Brief No. 7, Apr. 2010), available at http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Floodingthe 
Market.pdf 
 40. Id. See also Fox, supra note 15, at 213 (citing Tarak Anada, Comment, The Perfect 
Storm, an Imperfect Response, and a Sovereign Shield: Can Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring 
Negligence Claims Against the Government?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 285 n.32 (2008) (claiming 
Hurricane Betsy killed 81, injured in excess of 17,600, and displaced 250,000 residents)). 
 41. See HOLLADAY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 1. 
 42. Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 1301-02 (1965). 
 43. See Fox, supra note 15, at 213–14.  
 44. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 367 n.10 (quoting NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 1 (2002), available at http://www.fema.gov/fima/nfip. 
shtm) (The private flood insurance market would not develop “primarily because of the 
catastrophic nature of flooding and the inability to develop an actuarial rate structure which 
could adequately reflect the risk to which flood-prone properties are exposed.”); see also MARK 
S. DORFMAN & DAVID A. CATHER, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE 29 
(6th ed.) (explaining that private insurance companies prefer not to insure catastrophic, non-
diversifiable events like floods). Because of their aversion to catastrophic, non-diversifiable 
events, and given the like, nature of flood events, the private insurance industry may never enter 
the market without public subsidy. Theoretically, however, private insurers will insure most 
events if premiums and deductibles reach high enough levels. Id.  
 45. See DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 44, at 29–30. 
In its simplest form, risk diversification is a process in which the financial losses of a 
few members in a group are spread across a much larger number of people in the 
group who have not suffered a loss . . . Crucial to the success of such risk-bearing 
arrangements is making sure that there are a large number of clients to share the risk, 
and that the risk is not likely to cause a large number of group members to suffer a loss 
at the same time and thus financially overwhelm the group . . . Most common types of 
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concentrated impact, are considered non-diversifiable events and are 
thereby considered financially imprudent to insure against.
46
 
In 1968, Congress applied what it learned from the Southeast 
Hurricane Disaster Relief Act. It called on the federal government to 
step into the role private insurers would not, and offered its citizens 
flood insurance through the NFIP.
47
 The flood loss insurance was 
made available to—among others—homeowners, businesses, and 
renters.
48
  
Congress wanted to expand flood insurance coverage to more 
Americans, but likely did not anticipate the quagmire of financial and 
ecological problems the program would rouse.
49
 They believed the 
legislation was balanced and that over time, risk would be 
 
insurance, such as auto and life insurance, offer protection from risks well suited to 
diversification via risk pooling because the loss usually affects only one person, not a 
large number of clients in the same risk pool. On the other hand . . . catastrophic risks 
. . . [such as] floods, wars and unemployment—tend to be non-diversifiable risks for 
insurers because they often result in financial losses for a large number of people in the 
risk pool at the same time. Private insurers rarely offer insurance for non-diversifiable 
risk, recognizing that their financial strength could be harmed if such a catastrophic 
loss occurred. 
Id. at 5. 
 46. See id. at 29; see also Fox, supra note 15, at 213 (“The combination of high monetary 
losses . . . and inaccurate risk data makes flood insurance financially infeasible for many 
providers. Furthermore, those who purchase flood insurance tend to be those most at risk of 
flooding, and insurance companies are subjected to a large volume of claims from any given 
flood event.”). 
 47. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012)) (“The Congress finds that (1) from time to time flood 
disasters have created personal hardships and economic distress which have required 
unforeseen disaster relief measures . . . (3) as a matter of national policy, a reasonable method 
of sharing the risk of flood losses is through a program of flood insurance . . . .”). 
 48. See id. § 4012(a)-(b) (“In carrying out the flood insurance program, the Director shall 
afford a priority to making flood insurance available to cover residential properties which are 
designed for the occupancy of from one to four families, church properties, and business 
properties which are owned or leased and operated by small business concerns.”). 
 49. See id. U.S.C. § 4002(b)(1) (“The purpose of this Act, therefore, is to—
(1) substantially increase the limits of coverage authorized under the national flood insurance 
program.”).  
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appropriately delegated.
50
 Furthermore, Congress intended for the 
NFIP to curtail development in flood-prone areas.
51
   
The NFIP has failed to realize its goals.
52
 The program’s primary 
flaw thus far is the mandate to underprice premiums and otherwise 
ignore actuarial data, i.e., the likelihood a natural disaster would 
occur or the expected value of a flood policy claim.
53
   
B. NFIP Structure 
NFIP oversight falls to the Federal Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration (FIMA). FIMA is a branch of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), which in turn is a subset of the 
Department of Homeland Security.
54
 FIMA is sub-divided into 
insurance and mitigation functions.
55
  
For property owners to qualify for NFIP coverage, their locality 
must participate in the NFIP and develop “floodplain management 
policies to manage floodwaters and reduce risk to property.”56 
Participating communities must also create flood insurance rate maps 
(FIRMs) that identify special flood hazard areas, or one-hundred-year 
 
 50. See id. § 4001(d) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to (1) authorize a flood 
insurance program by means of which flood insurance, over a period of time, can be made 
available on a nationwide basis through the cooperative efforts of the Federal Government and 
the private insurance industry, and (2) provide flexibility in the program so that such flood 
insurance may be based on workable methods of pooling risks, minimizing costs, and 
distributing burdens equitably among those who will be protected by flood insurance and the 
general public.”). 
 51. See id. § 4001(e) (“It is the further purpose of this chapter to (1) encourage State and 
local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to constrict the development of 
land which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses, (2) guide 
the development of proposed future construction, where practicable, away from locations which 
are threatened by flood hazards . . . (5) authorize continuing studies of flood hazards in order to 
provide for a constant reappraisal of the flood insurance program and its effect on land use 
requirements.”). 
 52. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 366.  
 53. Lehrer, supra note 16, at 352. Also see Fox supra note 15, at 208. “[T]he 
NFIP…generates high costs for the federal government, mainly because premiums do not 
reflect actual flood risk and because many policyholders receive subsidized rates. These federal 
subsidies effectively underwrite the cost of coastal development. . . .” Id. 
 54. See FEMA Organizational Chart, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1422480349134-95c3a7f4e006fc39dd19d20c2c 067325/ 
FEMA_Org_Chart_1-26-2015_508.pdf (last updated Jan. 26, 2015). 
 55. Id.  
 56. HOLLADAY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 1. 
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floodplains (SFHAs).
57
 Federal funds may not be applied for the 
purpose of furthering construction in SFHAs without flood 
insurance.
58
 Further, flood insurance is required for properties within 
SFHAs that have a financial relationship or receive some form of 
assistance from a federal body.
59
 As of 2003, nearly 20,000 
communities across the United States and in Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands participated in the program.
60
 FEMA issued 5,629,396 
flood insurance policies in 2012.
61
  
NFIP coverage for FIRM areas—known as participating 
communities—is contingent on several requirements that are 
enforced by the participating community through its building 
standards.
62
 The FEMA administrator estimates these construction 
 
 57. See TETRA TECH, KITTITAS COUNTY HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN VOLUME 1: 
PLANNING-AREA-WIDE ELEMENTS 10-1 (2012), available at http://co.kittitas.wa.us/public-
works/hazard-mitigation-plan/documents/KittitasCoHMP_Vol1_Final_complete.pdf.  
The frequency and severity of flooding are measured using a discharge probability, 
which is a statistical tool used to define the probability that a certain river discharge 
(flow) level will be equaled or exceeded within a given year. Flood studies use 
historical records to determine the probability of occurrence for the different discharge 
levels. The flood frequency equals 100 divided by the discharge probability. For 
example, the 100-year discharge has a 1-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded 
in any given year…The extent of flooding associated with a 1-percent annual 
probability of occurrence (the base flood or 100-year flood) is used as the regulatory 
boundary by many agencies. 
Id. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (2012). 
 59. ANSWERS, supra note 2, at 11.  
 60. Id. at 3. “A community, as defined for the NFIP’s purposes, is any state, area, or 
political subdivision; any authorized tribal organization, or Alaska native village; or authorized 
native organization that has the authority to adopt and enforce floodplain management 
ordinances for the area under its jurisdiction.” Id. at 3. See also Flood Insurance: Challenges 
Facing the National Flood Insurance Program Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and 
Community Opportunity, Comm. on Financial Services, H. of Representatives, 108th Cong. 3 
n.1 (2003) (statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director Physical Infrastructure). 
 61. See Fox, supra note 15, at 214. 
 62. Id. “[The] lowest floor of the structure be elevated to or above the base flood level—
the highest elevation at which there is a 1-percent chance of flooding in a given year.” Id. See 
also DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NAT’L FLOOD INS. FUND, 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2012), available at https://www.fema. 
gov/pdf/about/budget/11h_fema_nfi_fund_dhs_fy13_cj.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2013 
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION].  
By law, FEMA can only provide flood insurance to those States or communities that 
adopt and vigorously enforce floodplain management regulations that meet or exceed 
minimum NFIP requirements. Communities incorporate NFIP requirements into their 
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requirements save approximately $1.7 billion in annual avoided flood 
damage.
63
 The NFIP incentivizes local mitigation efforts through a 
system of discounts that a community may pass on to its citizens 
through a community rating system (CRS).
64
 A CRS “encourages 
adoption of more effective measures that protect natural and 
beneficial floodplain functions” in exchange for “credits on premium 
rates for flood insurance coverage . . . based on the estimated 
reduction in flood and erosion damage risks.”65 The NFIP also 
provides funds for certain mitigation efforts.
66
 Flood mitigation 
components of the NFIP are small by financial comparison to its 
insurance element, but they highly valued regulatory levers for flood 
management.
67
   
 
zoning codes, subdivision ordinances, and/or building codes, or they adopt special 
purpose floodplain management ordinances. NFIP requirements include: [1] Elevation 
of new and substantially improved residential structures above the base flood level. 
[2] Elevation or dry floodproofing (made watertight) of new or substantially improved 
nonresidential structures. [3] Regulation of development in floodways, the central 
portion of a riverine floodplain needed to carry deeper and faster moving water, to 
ensure that there are no increases in upstream elevations. [4] Additional requirements 
to protect buildings in coastal areas from the impacts of waves, high velocity, and 
storm surge.  
Id. 
  63. See Fox, supra note 15, at 214. “These requirements are the most cost-effective way to 
reduce the flood risk to new buildings and infrastructure. Structures built to NFIP standards 
experience 80 percent less damage than structures not built to these standards, and have resulted 
in $1.7 billion per year in reduced flood losses.” Id. 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 4022 (b)(1)-(3) (2012).  
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 4022 (b) (2012). Also see Fox, supra note 15, at 215–16. “The CRS is a 
voluntary incentive system that offers community-wide discounts on insurance premiums in 
exchange for additional flood mitigation measures. A community’s prevention efforts are rated 
according to the CRS scale, and communities may earn discounts of up to 45% for SFHA, or 
10% for non-SFHA.” Id.  
 66. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 374 n.69 (discussing 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.1.6, Flood 
Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program, http://www.fema.gov/fima/fma.shtm (last visited Sept. 
2, 2005)). “Grants are available for administration, planning, technical assistance, and 
implementation of mitigation programs.” Id. 
 67. See FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION supra note 62, at 1. 
“Currently the NFIP insures more than 5.5 million residential and commercial policyholders 
totaling approximately $1.2 trillion insurance coverage.” Id. Compare to the “$1.7 billion in 
flood-related losses avoided annually” from “flood hazard grant programs and floodplain 
management efforts.” Id. More specifically, the FEMA fiscal year 2013 request for 
Grants/Subsidies/Contributions was $115,424,000 and $1,401,715,000 for Insurance Claims 
and Indemnity. Id. at 22. See also ABHAS K JHA, ROBIN BLOCH, & JESSICA LAMOND, supra 
note 29, at 311 (discussing land use planning).  
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C. NFIP Reforms & Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2012 
The NFIP’s inadequacies began to emerge shortly after its 
passage.
68
 US population growth and rapid suburbanization in flood 
risk areas necessitated Congressional action to amend the NFIP to 
avoid potentially dire consequences for both the program’s budget 
and communities where population growth and development was 
incentivized by masking true flood risk.
69
  Congress passed its first 
NFIP correction with the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973.
70
 
The 1973 act made the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for 
buildings within SFHAs.
71
 Then, on the coattails of the Great 
Mississippi Flood of 1993, Congress passed the National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which further expanded the 
 
Two of the most effective regulatory systems are land use planning and the finance 
and insurance sector . . . Both seek to control unregulated development of the 
floodplain, the former by land use plans and development frameworks to guide and 
control development and the latter by imposing minimum design standards for finance 
and insurance provision. 
Id.  
 68. See Bruce W. Merwin, The National Flood Insurance Program—Future Use of the 
Flood Plain?, 1 URB. L. REV. 135, 136, (1977). A flood insurance scholar at the time noted 
that “flood losses are increasing substantially as a result of the accelerating development and 
concentration of people in flood hazard areas.” Id. 
 69.  Flood insurance premiums that discount the true cost of a flood event for a landowner 
increase the value of the discounted parcel over its otherwise un-subsidized premium value by 
virtue of the discounted expense that the landowner would otherwise incur. That parcel’s 
reduced flood expense increases its viability for development relative to a parcel without the 
benefit of the subsidy. The value of the subsidized flood-risk is baked into the value of the 
parcel. For editorial commentary on US development patterns and policy, see James Howard 
Kunstler, Home From Nowhere, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 1996/09/home-from-nowhere/376664/.  
Human settlements are like living organisms. They must grow, and they will change. 
But we can decide on the nature of that growth—on the quality and the character of 
it—and where it ought to go. We don’t have to scatter the building blocks of our civic 
life all over the countryside, destroying our towns and ruining farmland.  
Id. 
 70. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 4001, 87 Stat. 975 
(1968) (amended 1973). 
 71.  Id. 
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requirement to purchase flood insurance and bolstered federal flood 
mitigation efforts.
72
  
Congress acted again in 2004 with the passage of the Bunning-
Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004.
73
 The act 
emphasized improved mitigation efforts—and possible relocation—
for property owners who suffered from repeat flood incidents.
74
 The 
2004 act is notable for its requirement to increase premiums in 
situations where owners fail to accept assistance for mitigation of 
repetitively flooded property.
75
  
In 2010, as Congress continued to contemplate reformation of the 
NFIP, evidence mounted that the program was unsustainable.
76
 The 
NFIP was incapable of charging “market rates, hold[ing] reserve 
funds, or purchas[ing] reinsurance,” making the possibility of 
financial independence, let alone solvency, unlikely.
77
 Below-market 
NFIP insurance rates triggered new environmental externalities and 
shifted flood risk otherwise formerly held by those who owned and or 
developed property in ecologically sensitive and flood-prone areas to 
the federal government and taxpayers.
78
 Furthermore, while 
environmental damage and financial risk was “widely distributed to 
 
 72. See Riegle Community Development and Regulator Improvement Act of 1994, P.L. 
103-325, § 4001, Stat. 511, available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-
1545-20490-4986/frm_rf94.pdf.  
 73. Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
264, § 4001, Stat. 712. 
 74. See id. The act’s preamble noted that, “approximately 48,000 properties currently 
insured under the program have experienced, within a 10-year period, 2 or more flood losses 
where each such loss exceeds the amount $1000.” Id. § 2(3); see also id. § 102(g) (“A State or 
community may take action under subsection (c)(2) to purchase a severe repetitive loss 
property.”). 
 75. See id. § 102(h)(1). See also id. § 102(a) (directing FEMA to provide funds for 
mitigation activities that include “elevation, relocation, demolition, and floodproofing of 
structures, and minor physical localized flood control projects, and the demolition and 
rebuilding of properties to at least Base Flood Elevation . . . .”). 
 76. See ANSWERS, supra note 2, at 3. (“[T]he sale of flood insurance under the NFIP is 
subject to FEMA rules and regulations. FEMA has elected to have state-licensed insurance 
companies’ agents and brokers sell flood insurance to consumers.”); see also HOLLADAY & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at i (“Because of its below-market insurance rates and the intense 
hurricane-related floods in recent years, the NFIP has accrued a substantial deficit: $19 billion. 
As currently structured, the program will not be able to repay this debt.”). 
 77. See HOLLADAY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at i. 
 78. Id. at 3. 
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taxpayers,” the benefits largely fell to Gulf Coast states and owners 
of vacation residences.
79
 
The share of Americans who benefit from NFIP flood policy also 
experience disparate exposure to natural disasters. Hurricane Sandy 
caused nearly $65 billion in damage to the East Coast.
80
 With 
similarly staggering numbers, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina and other 
major storms cost an estimated $20 billion.
81
 These storms were 
outliers, but they illustrate the cataclysmic cost of rebuilding an area 
affected by just one natural event along with the problems posed by 
discounting flood risk.
82
  
An inadequate premium revenue stream to the NFIP risk reserve 
does not excuse the federal government from paying claims to 
policyholders. Further, because of other legislation like the Stafford 
Act—which provides federal funds to state and local governments to 
perform infrastructure repair—the ultimate result is additional federal 
debt set forth to promote unwise land use.
83
   
 
 79. Id. at i. See also Vishaan Chakrabarti, America’s Urban Future, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/americas-urban-future.html?_r=0 (providing 
a corollary to the imbalance of flood insurance benefits reaped from a small segment of coastal 
and river dwellers.). 
A staggering 90 percent of our gross domestic product and 86 percent of our jobs are 
generated in 3 percent of the continental United States, namely our cities . . . 
Unfortunately, our state and federal policies continue to encourage the opposite. 
Sprawl didn’t just happen—it is a direct consequence of ‘big government.’ Cities don’t 
keep the wealth they generate: Our major cities send billions more in tax dollars to the 
suburbs, via state and federal coffers, than they get back . . . I am not arguing that 
people should not live in suburbs. But we shouldn’t pay them to do so . . . 
Id. Chakrabarti’s key point ties into the argument against non-risk adjusted flood insurance 
incentives and the notion that the federal government should not “pay” for development in 
flood prone areas. Id. 
 80. Doyle Rice, Hurricane Sandy, Drought Cost U.S. $100 billion, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 
2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/01/24/global-disaster-report-
sandy-drought/1862201/. 
 81. HOLLADAY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 1. 
 82. Id. at 2 (“[A] single flood event can affect a great number of covered properties, none 
of which have paid insurance premiums at a market rate.”). 
 83. Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, Repeatedly, the 
Critics Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/ 
earth/as-coasts-rebuild-and-us-pays-again-critics-stop-to-ask-why.html?pagewanted=all. The 
federal government also contributes relief funds to flood disaster areas by way of the Stafford 
Act. Id. These funds however go directly to state and local governments to repair infrastructure. 
Id. “Experts say the law is at least as important as the flood program in motivating 
reconstruction after storms” because it “shields local and state governments from the full 
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Furthermore, a continuing source of funds to rebuild after flood 
events coupled with improperly adjusted premiums has helped foster 
a difficult-to-break attachment to high-risk land in certain locales.  
According to one resident of Dauphin Island, Alabama, “[w]e’re 
Americans, damn it. Retreat is a dirty word.”84 Between 1988 and 
2012 residents of Dauphin Island paid just under 13 percent in flood 
premiums compared to what they received in NFIP payments to 
rebuild after floods.
85
 Despite repeated flooding of the small island, 
some residents paid as little as $700 annually, while the highest 
premiums were approximately $3,000 a year.
86
 
The goal of Biggert-Waters was to deter continued reconstruction 
in places like Dauphin Island. Politically, the law “was a 
breakthrough in one sense . . . both traditionally conservative free-
market groups and traditionally progressive environmental groups 
supported [it] enthusiastically.”87 The act passed with bipartisan 
support in 2012, just months before Hurricane Sandy hit.
88
 
Congress primarily approved Biggert-Waters to allow FEMA to 
mandate “more realistic insurance rates that closely reflect “the rates 
private companies would charge.”89 Specifically, Biggert-Waters 
raised “insurance premiums for some ‘non-conforming properties’ 
that [had] been provided flood insurance at below-market rates since 
 
implications of their decisions on land use.” Id. According to a Government Accountability 
Office report, the federal government committed more than $80 billion in Stafford Act funds 
from 2004 to 2011. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. (“Dauphin Island property owners have paid only $9.3 million in premiums to the 
national flood insurance program, but they have received $72.2 million in payments for their 
damaged homes.”). 
 86. Id. Ironically, one of the residents of Dauphin Island interviewed for this piece, 
remarked at his strong emotional attachment to the island’s natural elements, stating “There’s a 
lot of wildlife and a lot of bird life . . . [y]ou can sit on the porch and watch the dolphins swim 
past your house.” Id. Surely most ecologists would agree that the Dauphin Island natural habitat 
would improve absent continued human habituation and repeated construction associated with 
flood recovery. Id. 
 87. Lehrer, supra note 16, at 351. 
 88. Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher Flood 
Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/nyregion/ 
overhaul-and-a-hurricane-have-flood-insurance-rates-set-for-huge-increases.html. “‘Biggert-Waters 
was passed with overwhelmingly bipartisan support,’ said Caroyln Kousky, a fellow at 
Resources for the Future, a research group that has focused on flood insurance. ‘The right and 
left were aligned in moving toward risk-based rates.’” Id. 
 89. See Joyce, supra note 6. 
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. . . the 1970’s.”90 Additionally, Biggert-Waters’ establishment of the 
“technical mapping advisory council [(TMAC)]—intended to 
improve the maps [used] to define flood rates,” allowed premiums 
“to rise at a significant rate on the basis of the new maps,” and 
encouraged transformation of some of the federal government’s flood 
risk “to the private sector through the purchase of reinsurance.”91 The 
TMAC was charged to insure FIRMs reflected accurate flood risk.
92
 
Furthermore, FIRMs would be updated and reviewed on an ongoing 
basis through the new National Flood Mapping Program (NFMP).
93
  
Nonetheless, premium discounts were grandfathered for properties 
insured prior to the new FIRM system, even in SFHAs.
94
 In 2013, 
approximately 20 percent of flood insurance policies received some 
form of discount, ranging from a 55 to 60 percent price reduction 
from full.
95
 Biggert-Waters was set to begin phasing out the 
grandfathered rate discounts at a pace of 20 percent per year until the 
premiums were accurately adjusted for risk.
96
  
D. Criticism of Biggert-Waters and Initial Efforts to Curtail the Act 
As the water receded after Hurricane Sandy, many coastal 
residents were left with a brutal choice—rebuild their homes or move 
on. Their conundrum was driven not only by the predicted increase in 
 
 90. Lehrer, supra note 16, at 352. Reinsurance is a tool for insurance companies to pass 
part of their risk to other insurance companies or group of insurance companies. This risk 
assessment limits the loss a primary insurer may suffer. Typically, reinsurance regulations 
require some measure of liquidity or solvency reserves. See generally Reinsurance, INS. INFO. 
INST. (Nov. 2014), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/reinsurance. 
 91. Leher, supra note 16, at 352–53. 
 92. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
§ 100215(c)-(d), 126 Stat. 916 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4101a(c)-(d) (2012)). See also Fox, 
supra note 15, at 227 (stating that TMAC needed to consider “the best available climate science 
and risk of sea level rise”). 
 93. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 § 100216(a). 
 94. Fox, supra note 15, at 217.  
 95. Id. Additionally, the author points out: 
“Compounding the actuarial instability of the NFIP, even unsubsidized premium rates 
do not reflect actual risk levels. Premium rates are set not based on NFIP’s actual loss 
experience, but on a hydrologic model. Using that model, NFIP’s stated goal is to 
collect sufficient premiums to cover at least the historical average loss year.”  
Id. 
 96. Id. at 228.  
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strong storms, but also by a far more expensive flood insurance 
requirement.
97
 For some residents, the choice was illusory. Revised 
flood maps would include more buildings and, in most cases, dictate 
that the NFIP charge significantly higher premiums,
98
 meaning flood 
insurance costs were expected to remain prohibitively expensive.
99
  
The higher premiums caused outrage and triggered politicians in 
flood-prone regions to take steps to delay implementation of the rate 
increases.
100
 Just as Biggert-Waters passed with bipartisan support, 
Congressional members of both parties took a vested interest in 
hampering the act’s realization.101 Political pressure to limit Biggert-
Waters also emerged at local political levels. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
formed the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency.
102
 The 
 
 97. Christopher Joyce, In Sandy’s Wake, Flood Zones and Insurance Rates Re-Examined, 
NPR (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/30/241690144/in-sandys-wake-fema-re-
examines-flood-insurance-rates [hereinafter In Sandy’s]. “And scientists say there will be many 
more Sandy-style storms—that is, torrential rain and wind that create heavy coastal flooding—
and they’ll be more frequent than in the past.” Id. “Sea level is changing and it is going to keep 
changing . . . . [T]he impacts are going to become more and more frequent and severe.” Id. 
 98. See Anderson, supra note 88 (“For the last seven years, Palmer Doyle . . . has paid 
between $350 and $458 annually for flood insurance. He lives a block and a half from the water 
in Queens . . . . Now, though, the costs for Mr. Doyle are about to jump to as much as $15,000 
annually . . . .”). 
 99. Id. “[I]t’s also a bitter pill for many.” Id. According to Robert Moore, senior policy 
analyst for the Natural Resources Defense Council, “People obviously have a little bit of sticker 
shock.” Id. Democratic New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez said, “many homeowners will be 
forced to pay premiums that are several times higher than the current rate they pay,” and he 
called the Biggert-Waters-induced new FEMA flood maps and higher insurance rates “a man-
made disaster.” Id. 
 100. Id.  
In Brick Township, N.J., local officials have paid a mapping expert to obtain 
certification in floodplain technology to challenge the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s new flood maps. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg has proposed 
changes to make flood insurance more affordable and accessible. Senators from flood-
prone states, including New York, New Jersey and Louisiana, have offered 
amendments and bills to extend the time frame over which the steep rates go into 
effect. 
Id. 
 101. Cosponsors: H.R. 2199, 113th Cong. (2013–2014), available at http://beta.congress. 
gov/bill/113th/house-bill/2199/cosponsors. Cosponsors include twenty-four Democrats and 
nine Republicans. Id. 
 102. Anderson, supra note 88. 
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initiative recommended that Biggert-Waters be amended to provide 
for “cheaper insurance with higher deductibles.”103  
In response to the growing outcry, despite still favorable 
arrangements for many subsidized property owners in flood-prone 
areas, the Biggert-Waters co-sponsor, Maxine Waters, worked to 
deconstruct her 2012 efforts to the dismay of FEMA, free-marketers, 
environmentalists, and fiscal conservatives.
104
  
As a result of Rep. Water’s initiative, a contingent of 
representatives elected who almost exclusively served coastal 
districts introduced House Bill H.R. 2199.
105
 The bill was introduced 
as an amendment to Biggert-Waters and sought to delay key aspects 
of the act, most notably, the implementation of proper risk-adjusted 
premiums.
106
 Additionally, the bill was drafted to postpone the 
prohibition against subsidized rates for any property purchased after 
the enactment of Biggert-Waters.
107
  
Some critics of Biggert-Waters argued that improvements to flood 
mitigation systems should be the goal of federal flood policy.
108
 
 
 103. Id. “The report also called on FEMA to give financial credit to people who undertake 
renovations to protect their property, like moving boilers from the basement to the first floor.” 
Id. See also In Sandy’s, supra note 97 (quoting Robert Moore, senior policy analyst for the 
Natural Resources Defense Council: “New York City formerly had about 35,000 buildings 
sitting in flood zones. That number has now doubled.”). 
 104. Davenport, supra note 22. “Tucked into broader transportation legislation, the bill had 
enthusiastic support across the political spectrum, from liberal environmentalists to fiscal 
conservatives. But Ms. Waters is now leading an effort in the House to gut the legislation she 
sponsored.” Id. 
 105. See Cosponsors: H.R. 2199, 113th Cong. (2013–2014) (The exceptions were Rep. 
William Enyart, from Illinois’s 12th district, and Rep. Bruce Braley, from Iowa’s 1st district. It 
is worth noting that both Enyart and Braley’s districts encompass flood-prone areas, and the 
bill’s sponsors were all from coastal states.). 
 106. See id. (summarizing H.R. 2199: “Delays until three years after enactment of this Act 
the requirement of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 . . . that any 
property located in an area participating in the national flood insurance program have the risk 
premium rate charged for flood insurance on the property adjusted to accurately reflect its 
current risk of flood.”). 
 107. See id. (summarizing H.R. 2199: “Amends the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
to delay until five years after enactment of Biggert-Waters the prohibition against provision to 
prospective insureds of flood insurance by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) at (subsidy) rates less than full actuarial estimates for property purchased after 
enactment of Biggert-Waters.”). 
 108. Anderson, supra note 88. Former New York Mayor, Michael Bloomberg’s office 
asserted that as many as eight hundred thousand New Yorkers statewide would lie in a one-
hundred-year-floodplain by the 2050s. Id. According to Bloomberg’s senior mayoral aide, Seth 
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Accordingly, H.R. 2199 also encouraged state and local governments 
to invest in flood-protection infrastructure by disallowing FEMA to 
consider federal funding “when determining if a community has 
made adequate progress on flood protection improvement 
systems.”109 The bill was also intended to make Biggert-Waters more 
reasonable for property owners by prohibiting immediate premium 
increases in the wake of flood disasters that compromised a relevant 
local flood-protection system.
110
  
Few insurance and economics experts disagree that the flood 
insurance program needs to be overhauled.
111
 According to Frank W. 
Nutter, the president of the Reinsurance Association of America, 
“The program is $26 billion in debt and much of that debt is borne by 
federal taxpayers who do not have flood insurance . . . they are 
subsidizing those that do.”112 For example, property owners in high-
risk areas file 80 percent of NFIP claims and receive two-thirds of 
disaster assistance when flooded.
113
 
 
Pinsky, “[t]he risk that New York faces is a combination of residents being priced out of their 
homes and realistic mitigation measures not being incentivized by the strategy of the federal 
flood insurance program . . .” Id. (emphasis added).  
 109. See H.R. 2199, 113th Cong., supra note 105. Unfortunately, flood-protection systems 
for certain areas invariably cause other areas along the river to become flooded. Id. In other 
words, flood-protection systems simply shirk the flood off on a different area; it is an imperfect 
system. Id. 
 110. Id.  
Makes flood insurance available at certain special flood hazard area rates to riverine 
and coastal levees located in a community which FEMA has determined to be in the 
process of restoring a flood protection system previously accredited on a Flood 
Insurance Rate Map as providing 100-year frequency flood protection but which no 
longer does so. 
Id. 
 111. See generally Houck, supra note 36, at 64. Rather than halt or hinder the flood policy 
disaster circuit outlined in Houck’s 1986 article, it is still alive and well. The cycle includes: 
“(1) flooding, (2) flood losses, (3) disaster relief, (4) flood control projects . . . , (5) renewed 
encroachment and development onto the floodplain and upstream watershed, (6) flooding, 
(7) flood losses, (8) disaster relief, (9) more projects, (10) more encroachment and 
development, ad infinitum.” Id.  
 112. Anderson, supra note 88. 
 113. NFIP, About the National Flood Insurance Program: When Insurance is Required, 
FLOODSMART.GOV (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/when_ 
insurance_is_required.jsp [hereinafter About the National]. A “high-risk” area has “at least a 1 
in 4 chance of flooding during a 30-year mortgage.” Id. 
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Nonetheless, many residents questioned the economics and 
financial sense of the program’s rate increases. Stephen C. Acropolis, 
mayor of Brick Township, is an example. Before Biggert-Waters, he 
paid $1,200 annually for flood insurance. Then his rates accelerated 
to $10,000 a year. Mr. Acropolis asserted that he would “not pay 
$10,000 for flood insurance because the most I will get for my house 
is $80,000 to $90,000 to repair it . . . [every] 10 years, I will pay for 
my house to be totally replaced. It doesn’t make any sense.”114 
Passage of the Affordability Act helped soften the blow for 
homeowners faced with higher premiums.
115
 In Pennsylvania, for 
example, the Affordability Act granted some thirty-five thousand 
flood insurance policyholders temporary reprieve from rising rates.
116
 
Existing rate hikes spoiled the potential sale of some flood insured 
homes when buyers learned of the premium growth.
117
    
E. The Moral Hazard of Flood Insurance and the Affordability Act’s 
Curtailment of Biggert-Waters 
The policy behind subsidizing flood insurance premiums is 
fraught with moral hazard.
118
 It masks the true cost of a flood-risk 
property and perpetuates development and redevelopment in areas 
where building may otherwise be unlikely to occur. Once a flood 
 
 114. Anderson, supra note 88. 
 115. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 385 (2015), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf. “[The Affordability Act] reinstated 
certain premium subsidies and slowed down certain premium rate increases that had been 
included in the Biggert-Waters Act. Aspects of HFIAA were intended to address affordability 
concerns for certain property owners, but may also increase NFIP’s long-term financial burden 
on taxpayers.” Id. 
 116. Lindstrom, supra note 21 (reporting that “[s]ome Pennsylvania policyholders have 
already reported facing increases of thousands to tens of thousands of dollars annually . . .”). 
 117. Id. Senator Bob Casey, Democrat from Pennsylvania said he was pleased the Senate 
passed the bipartisan legislation. He stated further, that the bill would give “peace of mind that 
this legislation will prevent sudden drastic rate hikes” from the implementation of Biggert-
Waters. Id. 
 118. Joyce, supra note 6.  
Meanwhile, people keep rebuilding in flood zones, in part because FEMA offers 
cut-rate prices on one-fifth of its policies. . . . Fugate made it clear that this is bad 
policy: “The moral hazard of subsidizing risk is, we’re going to rebuild right where we 
were, just the way it was, and we’re going to get wiped out.”  
Id. 
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disaster hits, the insured property owners are permitted to rebuild in a 
place clearly not meant for long-term habitation. Artificially low 
flood insurance premiums promote growth in towns and cities built 
out of flood-rich soil—places not meant for development. 
Furthermore, local governments are often not punished for their role 
in reckless land use decisions, as the Stafford Act typically pays for 
repairs to infrastructure damage in flood damaged areas.
119
   
In addition to tampering with the value of flood risk properties 
and the economy of the towns or cities with which they are a part, 
reducing the cost to build in flood plains has devastating ecological 
impacts. These low-risk, low-cost sites for suburban sprawl threaten 
to eliminate the benefits of floodplains.
120
 Further, the downstream 
consequences of dams and levees alter ecosystems, hasten river 
currents, and direct floods to non-natural flood areas and 
landowners.
121
 Natural floodplains should be used for parks and 
recreation, not subdivisions and strip-malls. The ecological damage is 
caused by a shift in “insurance risks to the taxpayers” and a reduction 
in “long-term private costs of building in floodplains.”122 This 
“development will inevitably trigger environmental damage.”123 
Despite the adverse ecological and long-term economic 
consequences of artificially low flood insurance costs, the 
Affordability Act’s reversal of Biggert-Waters’ swift removal of 
subsidized flood premiums may help temper near-term economic 
punishment to local insured areas.
124
 
 
 119. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5172(a) (1988). (“The President may make contributions—(1) to a State or local government 
for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a public facility which is damaged 
or destroyed by a major disaster and for associated expenses incurred by such government 
. . . .”). 
 120. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESTORING AND PROTECTING 
FLOODPLAINS (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/environ/Floodplains.pdf.  
 121. See Houck, supra note 36.  
 122. HOLLADAY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 3. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Consider a flood-risk town occupied primarily by property owners who will pay two 
or three times more for flood insurance premiums. Property values in that town will fall because 
the cost of owning property will go up. Rents will increase relative to the change in the cost of 
maintaining or insuring the property. The increase in housing costs will decrease discretionary 
spending and saving among the affected group. Meanwhile, because commercial property costs 
will also rise, an increase in the cost of goods and services will follow.  
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The Biggert-Waters implementation was likely complicated by the 
political concerns of coastal lawmakers. These particular 
representatives hoped to avoid constituent anger caused by the newly 
instated flood insurance premiums, which increased the costs of 
owning a flood insured property and decreased its market value.
125
 
Indeed, the high premiums could force some residents to move—and 
sell their homes for less than before Biggert-Waters—and also make 
a coverage lapse more likely.
126
 
The Biggert-Waters political storm likely stems from anger over 
flood insurance premiums. As the act mandates that prices reflect risk 
yet keeps intact the requirement to purchase flood insurance if the 
property lies in a “high-risk” flood area and is encumbered by a 
federally regulated or insured lender, constituent and political anger 
may not be an unwarranted response.
127
 Premium cost concerns 
together with the opportunity to better incorporate environmentalist 
and free-market ideas, are cause for a reimagining of the NFIP—to 
improve on the Biggert-Waters amendments.
128
  
Biggert-Waters fell short in several key categories. It “continue[d] 
a near-total federal government monopoly on writing primary flood 
insurance for private homes and smaller businesses for at least 
another five years”, failed to impose “‘mandatory purchase’ of flood 
insurance for holders of federally backed mortgages” in high-risk 
areas and “‘residual risk’ areas located behind levees”, and does not 
reign in the NFIP’s massive debt–which grew by $3 billion since 
November, 2012 to approximately $23 billion as of December 31, 
2014.
129
 
 
 125. See generally Anderson, supra note 88. Considered in a vacuum (e.g., independent of 
tax effects and intrinsic value considerations), if the cost to own or operate an asset increases 
without equal or greater growth in that asset’s revenue production, then the asset’s profitability 
will fall, as will its market value.  
 126. See id. 
 127. About the National, supra note 113. 
 128. Lehrer, supra note 16, at 353–54. 
 129. Id. at 353 (describing Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-141, § 100206, 126 Stat. 916). Lehrer also asserts that these measures were included in 
the original language of the bill. Id. (internal citations omitted). He further emphasizes that 
properties located behind levees are not required to purchase flood insurance. Id. (internal 
citations omitted). See High Risk, supra note 115, at 385. “As of December 31, 2014, FEMA 
owed the Treasury $23 billion, up from $20 billion as of November 2012. FEMA made a $1 
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This is not to say that Biggert-Waters should be completely 
overhauled. It promoted many noble policies. Most notably, it 
discouraged development in high-risk areas by beginning to demand 
appropriate actuarial rates, called for updated technical oversight and 
FIRMs, and allowed FEMA to participate in the private reinsurance 
market.
130
 These aspects of the law should be preserved and 
improved.
131
 
However, the Affordability Act strips the NFIP of its central 
Biggert-Waters alterations.
132
 It effectively neuters § 4014(g), which 
ended subsidies for new or lapsed NFIP policies, and eliminates 
§ 4015(h), which called for “the risk premium rate charged for flood 
insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current 
risk of flood to such property.”133  
These changes are unfortunate given the significant political will 
required to achieve passage of risk-adjusted premiums. Rather than 
gut the heart of Biggert-Waters, Congress should have dialed back 
premium increases across the board to mete out financial stability 
without drastic reductions in premium affordability and adjust the 
NFIP to more effectively direct thoughtful land use development.  
 
billion principal repayment at the end of December 2013—FEMA’s first such payment since 
2010.” Id. 
 130. Lehrer, supra note 16, at 351, 352–53. 
 131. See Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: Section by Section Highlights, NAT’L ASS’N 
REALTORS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.realtor.org/articles/flood-insurance-reform-act-of-2012-
section-by-section-highlights. Most politically troubling—but effective long-term—is 
§ 100205. It requires implementation, at 25 percent annually, actuarial rates for second homes, 
businesses, severe repetitive loss properties, and properties with substantial damage or 
improvements built before a community’s first FIRM. Id. 
 Section 100215 creates a Technical Mapping Advisory Council comprises of local, state, 
and national flood experts to recommend flood map standards. Id.  
 Section 100216 provides a mapping appeals court that allows local communities to request 
a remapping should they suspect their map does not fall within Technical Mapping Advisory 
Council guidelines. Id. 
 The last resort for community mapping appeals is the Scientific Resolution Panel, made up 
of at least five flood experts. Id. 
 See also High Risk, supra note 115, at 385. “[The Affordability Act] reinstated certain 
premium subsidies and slowed down certain premium rate increases that had been included in 
the Biggert-Waters Act . . . [it] intended to address affordability concerns for certain property 
owners, but may also increase NFIP’s long-term financial burden on taxpayers.” Id. 
 132. See High Risk, supra note 115, at 385.  
 133. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015(h) (2012). 
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II. PROPOSITIONS FOR NFIP REFORM 
Biggert-Waters began to address major structural hurdles that 
contributed to NFIP’s financial woes, but it did not do enough.134 In 
consideration of the Biggert-Waters shortcomings and the 
shortsighted modifications imposed by the Affordability Act, 
Congress should pass omnibus legislation that incorporates the 
following proposals to recast the NFIP as a financially sustainable 
and fair land use tool. The following proposals envision a forward-
thinking, financially sustainable NFIP—a twin-pillared program 
engendered to not only backstop property owners who suffer a flood 
event, but also provide states and localities with resources to 
permanently mitigate unreasonably risky land-use choices. An 
amended NFIP should slowly implement market driven policies to 
price premiums. Premium adjustments should increase at a rate that 
prevents local economies from suffering drastic financial adjustments 
for an inability to pay risk-adjusted premiums. Premiums should be 
implemented pragmatically over a longer time period than Biggert-
Waters, with special attention paid to primary home, operating 
businesses, and low-income neighborhoods. Furthermore, a greater 
share of NFIP funds should be directed to states and localities to 
engage in permanent mitigation efforts—specifically, the public 
acquisition of high flood risk properties.  
Ultimately, a slower-paced schedule of premium increases and 
more proactive mitigation strategy, vis-à-vis securing public control 
over flood risk property, will help the NFIP reduce its debt, lower its 
contingent liability, and direct many Americans to abstain from 
detrimental land use choices that harm the natural system, the federal 
fisc, and their own personal safety and finances.   
 
 134. See High Risk, supra note 115, at 385. First, it “excludes subsidized premium rates for 
new flood insurance policies and phases them out for many other properties, including those 
that have sustained repeated, severe losses and second homes.” Id. Second, FEMA must 
establish a reserve fund for the payment of claims and eventual repayment of Treasury debt. Id. 
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A. Anodyne Premium Increases 
Congress should pass omnibus legislation that more gradually 
implements premium increases. A US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report in 2015 made a frightening assertion: even if the 
Treasury forgave the NFIP’s approximately $20 billion debt, flood 
insurance premiums would need to increase annual subsidized rates 
by 150 to 325 percent.
135
  Such drastic increases would surely have a 
negative effect on flood insurance participation among property 
owners not required to purchase insurance. Reduced participation 
among this group would generate a greater need for FEMA disaster 
assistance loans and necessitate a further rise in premiums for the 
remaining insured.  
Instantly unleashing a free-market approach to flood insurance is 
reckless. Congress should pay heed to the implications of allowing 
risk-adjusted rates to set in without a significant cushion. The 
Affordability Act “reinstat[ed] certain premium subsidies and slowed 
down some premium rate increases . . . included in [Bigger Waters] 
requiring FEMA to refund premiums to certain policy holders.”136 
Yet, in the short time between Biggert-Waters and the Affordability 
Act, home prices declined in flood zones because of the higher 
premiums, an indication that anticipated increases to flood insurance 
premiums were a contributing factor.
137
  
Therefore, consider the implications of the fact that “flood 
insurance covers $1.3 trillion of property in all 50 states, with 
Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California and New Jersey making up two-
 
 135. Id. “Such rate increases could have negative effects on participation in NFIP, 
particularly among lower income property owners.” Id. 
 136. See High Risk, supra note 115, at 386. 
 137. Toluse Olorunnipa, Flood Insurance Price Hikes Wreak Havoc with Home Sales, ST. 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/flood-
insurance-price-hikes-wreak-havoc-with-home-sales/article_a130bc63-2244-5eeb-b607-6d0071 
3679da.html.  
Monthly premiums for more than 1 million homeowners are set to increase due to a 
rewrite by Congress last year of the federal flood insurance program. As a result, home 
prices in flood zones nationwide are declining as potential buyers balk at the 
premiums, said Moe Veissi, a Miami real estate agent who led the Chicago-based 
National Association of Realtors last year. 
Id. 
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thirds of all policies.”138 And further, that over one million 
homeowners are covered by flood insurance policies.
139
 It would be 
catastrophic if the majority of these properties were suddenly stricken 
with a 5 to 10 percent reduction in value (equating to an aggregate 
loss of $65–$130 billion in property value).140 This instantaneous 
contraction in real estate wealth would be particularly destructive for 
property tax revenues in the aforementioned coastal states and 
localities. 
One way of limiting the sting of necessary premium hikes, 
maintaining level participation, and controlling property value losses 
is to provide a longer linear phasing in of premium increases. 
Biggert-Waters sought incrementally increase premiums over a five-
year (20 percent per year) period to reach the desired actuarial 
level.
141
 Borrowing the GAO’s suggested average premium increases 
of 150 to 325 percent (if NFIP debt were forgiven), this premium 
increase schedule corresponds to annual growth of to 30 to 60 percent 
over five years.
142
  
Congress should implement premium increases over a slightly 
more protracted schedule. If the schedule included two additional 
years, premiums would grow over a seven-year span, resulting in an 
average raise of 21 to 46 percent annually.  
While a seven-year schedule still results in staggering rate 
increases relative to current levels it would afford time for local 
governments to prepare for lower property tax revenues and lenders 
that secured loans with affected properties to restructure their 
financing arrangements. Further, a seven-year span is far more 
palatable to voters and economies than a five-year implementation—
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. If the aggregate value of NFIP insured real estate is $1.3 trillion, a five percent 
reduction in value is equivalent to $65 billion and a ten percent reduction is equivalent to $130 
billion in value. Olorunnipa, supra note 137.  
 141. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4015(h) (2012) which, under the Affordability Act, will not be 
implemented: “Any increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood insurance on any 
property that is covered by a flood insurance policy on the effective date of such an update that 
is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year period, at the rate of 20 percent for 
each year following such effective date.” Id. 
 142. High Risk, supra note 115, at 385. For a nine-year phase-in, the annualized increases 
correspond to 16.6 to 36.1 percent. Id. These estimates do not consider inflation.  
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and certainly more so than a one-time increase. The downside of 
slower premium growth is the increased possibility that the NFIP will 
need to borrow more from the nation’s fisc should a significant 
disaster occur before the financial benefits related to actuarial 
premiums are realized.
143
  
While a Biggert-Waters pace of premium rate increases—five 
years—would be beneficial to the NFIP’s financial standing and 
would more rapidly marshal good land use policy, it poses a 
significant economic risk to both local and national governments and 
economies and must be approached with care. Any premium increase 
schedule should be structured in a manner that only subtly influences 
real estate markets.  
B. Ban Federal Mortgage Insurance for Flood Risk Properties   
Congress should no longer permit currently qualified borrowers 
from obtaining federally insured mortgages for the purchase of flood-
risk properties. Presently, borrowers who finance property with 
federally insured mortgages are required to obtain flood insurance if 
they live in a high-risk flood area.
144
 Federally insured mortgages are 
available to borrowers who are not market-competitive—most often 
because they are unable to amass a 20 percent equity down payment 
for the purchase of a home.
145
 By requiring NFIP insurance on 
federally insured mortgages on flood-risk properties, Congress is 
ostensibly requiring that the federal government backstop itself.
146
  
 
 143. See High Risk, supra note 115, at 386. It’s worth noting that the Affordability Act did 
take a small step to shore-up the NFIP risk profile. According to the GAO, it added “an annual 
surcharge for all policies ($25 for most policies) to be added to the reserve fund.” Nonetheless, 
FEMA claimed at the end of 2014, that “the required reserve fund balance (approximately $13 
billion) would be achieved in the next 20 years.” See High Risk, supra note 115, at 386–87.  
 144. About the National, supra note 113. 
 145. See Let FHA Loans Help You, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/ 
buying/loans (last accessed Dec. 24, 2015).  
 146. For example, should a property purchased with a federally-insured mortgage without 
flood insurance, suffer a total loss from a flood-event, then a rational borrower may chose to not 
rebuild the property improvements, walk away from the mortgage, and subsequently cause the 
federal government to reimburse the lender for non-repayment of their note. Conversely, should 
the borrower in this scenario insure the flood-loss property with the NFIP then the federal 
government would also incur the cost to restore value to the affected parties. Hence, in either 
case, the federal government is on the hook for any loss.  
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While ceasing federal mortgage insurance for sub-prime 
purchasers may be perceived as a draconian measure that goes 
against homeownership and decreases the number of potential 
purchasers for many, if not most, flood-risk properties—resulting in a 
reduction in the value of these properties (a cost to current owners)—
it ultimately forces potential new owners to assume their fair share of 
risk.  
Given that federal mortgage insurance is generally only available 
to sub-prime borrowers, the measure would prevent purchasers who 
are already at increased risk of triggering a federal insurance claim 
(e.g., defaulting on their mortgage) from incurring disproportional 
federal benefits where it is not necessary. Just as the Internal Revenue 
Service employs a policy that discourages not-for-profit corporations 
from “double-dipping” tax benefits, so too should individual 
borrowers who obtain federally-backed mortgages be disallowed 
from obtaining additional benefit by obtaining subsidized flood 
insurance.
147
  
Even if the NFIP were to allow such double-insurance, and not 
subsidize premiums on flood insurance for coverage on flood-risk 
properties obtained by federally insured mortgages, flood insurance 
premiums would in many cases elevate a borrower’s homeownership 
costs to a high level, such that they would be at increased risk of 
defaulting on their mortgage compared to a scenario that did not 
dictate that they obtain flood insurance.  
Absent the pairing of flood-insurance and federal mortgage 
insurance for flood-risk properties, the market would demand that 
borrowers be credit-worthy enough to not only obtain a mortgage 
without federal backing, but also be able to afford the actual cost of 
flood insurance. This is because, presumably, lenders would require 
that borrowers who secure their mortgage with a flood-risk property 
obtain flood insurance to protect that security. This would shift the 
burden and blame of increased property ownership costs to the 
mortgage instrument rather than flood insurance.
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 147. See, e.g., Education Benefits—No Double Benefits Allowed, IRS (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Education-Benefits-No-Double-Benefits-Allowed. 
 148. See Fox, supra note 15, at 216. (“Financial institutions may also require flood 
insurance for properties in participating communities outside SFHA.”). 
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Financial institutions may oppose this measure given that it could 
reduce the value of flood-risk properties on which they have secured 
mortgages and reduce the pool of potential borrowers. However, the 
measure would be popular among free-market proponents and 
concentrate risk management on the mortgage underwriting process. 
This is efficient and logical. Mortgage underwriting should 
comprehensively consider risk and banks that underwrite new loans 
for properties in high-risk flood areas should demand larger down 
payments or higher borrowing costs. In this way, mortgage 
underwriters could deter borrowers from purchasing homes in high-
flood risk areas and in some cases reward borrowers who obtain 
adequate flood insurance with lower interest rates.  
Lastly, banks could even incentivize borrowers to take flood 
mitigation measures if their collateral was in a flood zone.
149
 For 
example, a bank could adjust its interest rate if the borrower raised 
their home or installed breakout walls on the first floor. That way, 
private landowners would be encouraged to account for their own 
risk through personal mitigation and rely less on public infrastructure 
measures like levees, dikes, and dams.  
C. Replacement Land Tax Credit and Land Buy-back Program 
Property owners in flood plains, especially those in repeat flood 
areas or high-risk zones should be encouraged not to rebuild in the 
same place. Because property owners are currently only required to 
insure for the amount of any federally-backed outstanding mortgage 
on their property, many will not receive insurance payments adequate 
to rebuild, let alone purchase land elsewhere.
150
  
One way to soften the blow, while also encouraging development 
on high land, would be for the federal government to offer an 
 
 149. See Anderson, supra note 88. Consider, the affect mitigation can have on the cost of 
risk–this example is in the context of post Biggert-Waters NFIP insurance rates.  
George Kasimos . . . in Toms River [New Jersey] was put in a V Zone [“Velocity 
Zone”], which would have taken his rates to over $30,000 annually. Now he is in a less 
risky zone, but he still has to raise his home three feet. His flood insurance will be 
$8,300 a year.  
Id. 
 150. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2012). 
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investment tax credit for land purchases following a flood disaster. 
Perhaps the credit would be offered for two years following a flood 
disaster and be available to any property owner in the affected area, 
regardless of whether their land improvements were destroyed. The 
program could be further strengthened by states, which could enact 
similar tax motivations. 
The tax credit would incentivize property owners who had 
suffered flood damage and been awarded a flood insurance payment 
not to rebuild in an area with high flood-risk. The credit could be 
offered as a one-time investment tax credit structured as a percentage 
of the value of land purchased as a substitute for their flood-damaged 
property.  
The credit could also be scaled. For example, if a property owner 
moved from a SFHA to a moderate or low risk area they would be 
awarded a 20 percent credit, from SFHA to no risk area a 30 percent 
credit, or from moderate or low risk to a no risk area a 20 percent 
credit.  
The credit program could be renewed every five years, until a 
large portion of high-flood risk populations relocated. This action 
would benefit the homebuilding and real estate industry as it slowly 
incentivizes depopulation of flood-risk areas.  
Further, Congress should empower the National Parks Service 
(NPS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to offer to 
purchase certain land tracts from affected property owners. These 
land purchases would need to be in line with the NPS and BLM’s 
growth strategy. Nonetheless, Congressional authorization and 
funding of NPS and BLM land acquisitions from affected owners is a 
way for some repeat disaster areas to slowly come under the 
designation of protected federal land, shift development to more 
suitable areas, and reunite the country with its holistic hydrologic 
heritage espoused through avoidance and resilience techniques.
151
  
 
 151. See Helms, supra note 26. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
268 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 49:235 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The political dismantling of Biggert-Waters puts FEMA in a 
precarious position. As currently constructed, the NFIP will continue 
to accrue debt, property owners will not be compelled to avoid 
development in non-flood prone areas, and the flood risk pool will 
grow without adequate premium funding. There is no easy solution to 
NFIP reform. Residents in flood risk areas will need to pay more or 
move away. The eventual imposition of actuarial rates is likely 
unavoidable.  
Politicians can both please their constituents and bolster the NFIP 
by instituting premium increases—albeit, slower than directed by 
Biggert-Waters—as they simultaneously encourage policyholders to 
move out of floodplains and low-lying coastal areas, and allow the 
free market to take a larger role in controlling prudent land use 
decisions.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/15
